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Abstract 
This article analyzes Curtiss-Wright Aerospace Industry’s inflow process to the Turkish market in the 
early 1930s. In these years, aviation was a quite significant industry that contributed economic, military, 
and political prestige of the states. Progressive decision-makers of Turkey were looking for an 
opportunity to establish a partnership with a multinational company to manufacture its own aircraft 
because the young state was destitute of such technology. Curtiss-Wright was eager to do business in 
Turkey; two American pilots’ record-breaking flight from New York to Istanbul in 1931; withdraw of 
German Junkers Aerospace Industry’s from Turkey in 1929 and American Ambassador Joseph Grew’s 
public diplomacy between 1927 to 1932, helped this process. 
 
Keywords: Aviation industry, Turkish-American relations, economic relations, public diplomacy, 
foreign direct investment. 
 
 
Introduction 
  
The role of American multinational enterprises in Turkey is very significant 
not only in terms of Turkish-American economic relations, but also the publicity of 
the two states to each other. In general, enterprising processes consider many 
perspectives as availability of the skilled workforce, above-average growth prospects 
of the host country, transportation network, or investment suitability considering the 
direct constraints limitations. In addition to economic constraints, any multinational 
company and its government also need to consider political dimensions and 
advertisement techniques to sustain a healthy partnership in a foreign country. For 
instance, the good diplomatic relations between the governments and recognition of 
the brands, along with the promotion of advertising activities can be considered as 
other keys for the investment processes, as well. For instance, the story of Curtis 
Wright Aerospace Inc.’s (CW) penetration to the Turkish market in 1932 includes all 
these steps. It enlightens the Turkish-American relations from the late 1920s to the 
1930s as a case study, as well. It cites economic, political, and cultural cooperation in 
the relations in this period, includes many governmental and non-governmental  
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actors’ contributions and proves that Turkey and the USA started to develop a 
solid partnership long before forming an official alliance in the 1950s.  
Still, if the Turkish-American relations in the 1920s are considered, it 
would be challenging to picture an easy deal for CW in Turkey. Until 1927, 
these two governments did not formally recognize each other. If the political 
relations were that abysmal in the 1920s, how did an American multinational 
company become a monopoly in the aviation industry in Turkey, only five years 
after the first American ambassador arrived in Turkey? What has motivated 
both sides - the statist Turkish decision-makers and the agents of this company 
who did not know anything about Turkish markets? How did the two nations, 
mostly indifferent to each other throughout their history, became significant 
partners in a huge investment partnership? CW’s story in Turkey in the 1930s 
responds to all these questions.   
Diplomacy and propaganda. These words are crucial to evaluate the 
process in detail. In addition to the standard macroeconomic principles, these 
two definitive terms helped CW to enter the Turkish market in the early 1930s. 
In terms of the diplomacy branch, Joseph Grew, who was the first ambassador 
to the Turkish post, deserves credit. Grew worked hard and became a significant 
figure for the solutions to the historical problems between the two states and 
normalization of the relations with his well-practiced public diplomacy. 
Secondly, Turkey’s first aviation incorporated company, Tayyare ve Motor 
Türk Anonim Şirketi (Turkish Aircraft and Motor Incorporated Company) 
(TOMTAŞ), which was established in 1925 with the partnership of German 
Junkers Flugzeug und Motorenwerke AG (JFM), was dissolved in late 1929. 
The conclusion of such a partnership enabled Turkey to find a new partner in 
this field and gave an excellent opportunity to CW’s agents to step up in this 
industry in Turkey. In 1930, CW launched a propaganda tour in Turkey to 
present its products; still, a sensational event occurred in July 1931 helped CW 
to conclude the deal with Turkish decision-makers as the best advertisement 
they could ever canvas. Two American pilots, Johnnie Polando and Russell 
Boardman, made a record-breaking, non-stop flight with their Bellanca CH-300 
model plane (this company was designing aircraft for CW), from New York to 
Istanbul, which made a tremendous sensation about American aviation not only 
in Turkey but also the world. After their flight, these two American pilots 
welcomed as heroes wherever they went in Turkey, and finally, they were 
received and honored by President Mustafa Kemal Paşa himself. This incident 
demonstrated the success of the American aircraft industry and increased CW’s 
popularity in the Turkish public.
1
 
The aviation industry was increasing its popularity in the early 20
th 
century and proved its worth during World War I (WWI). Military use of the 
aircraft made a difference in the battlefield, and former Ottoman officers of new 
                                               
1  Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent era: a diplomatic record of forty years, 2nd vol (London: 
Hammond, 1953), 890-899. 
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decision-makers of the Republic of Turkey witnessed that impact. Even though 
the Ottoman Empire tried to adopt this technology with the help of their 
German allies,
2
 the efforts were bogged down in the setup stage due to the 
dissolution of the empire after WWI. After the foundation of the new republic, 
these decision-makers with the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Paşa set new state 
goals to achieve all-around modernization in the Western standards, and that 
goal included taking place in the aviation industry, as well.  
On the other hand, what were CW’s motivations to invest in this newly 
founded republic? First of all, the opportunity to become a monopoly in the 
Turkish market with higher profit margins was quite tempting in the early 1930s. 
In those years, Turkey had already ended her partnership with JFM due to several 
economic crises of this company and became a country owning an empty aircraft 
factory in Kayseri looking for another partner. In CW’s perspective, eliminating 
the factory cost and retaining the whole aviation market would be very profitable. 
Due to the former deal with the Germans did not only include aircraft producing 
but also owning of entirely different types of air concessions in Turkey. For 
instance, JFM, while in Turkey, was conducting aerial surveys, planning 
commercial air routes, and helping to establish airmail service. If CW becomes 
the new partner, they may benefit the whole package, as well.
3
 
This case study may appear as a minor incident in the history of Turkish-
American relations from the late 1920s to 1930s. However, this case gives 
various insights in terms of the progress of economic, military, and diplomatic 
relations between these two countries. In this context, this paper does not aim to 
explain what happened in 1932, when CW entered the Turkish market but why 
it happened in 1932. In this explanation, a narrow focus on the details of the 
agreement between the Turkish government and CW would not be enough to 
enlighten the process. Such a deal can be made with any company and any 
country. The uniqueness of this partnership has traces in the history of Turkish-
American relations since the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, in the 
progress of political relations between Turkey and the USA in the 1920s, in the 
modernity ambitions of the new Turkish republic and correct evaluation of the 
US Department of State and its agents of these ambitions. Still, the first highest 
share should be given to Grew’s diligent public diplomacy with a spot-on 
empathy with Turkish decision-makers and constructing of credible political 
and economic relations during his service. To this, the timing of the use of 
propaganda tools, advertisements, and their combination with Grew’s public 
diplomacy should be added. Therefore, this paper will primarily be a case study 
to explain how various propaganda techniques and public diplomacy helped the 
                                               
2  Yavuz Kansu, Sermet Şensöz, and Yılmaz Öztuna, Havacılık tarihinde Türkler, (Turks in 
Aviation History), volume 1 (Ankara: Hava Kuvvetleri Basımevi, 1971), 150. 
3  Roger Trask, “The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical 
Aid during the Atatürk Era,” The Business History Review 38 (1964): 70. 
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CW to enter the Turkish market in 1932, and in a broader dimension, it will 
enlighten the different perspectives of the Turkish-American relations in the 
1920s and 1930s. 
In parallel with the arguments of this paper, it would be better to 
deconstruct and evaluate the current literature on this topic. As the political and 
economic relations between Turkey and the US intensified in the 1950s, after 
the establishment of formal alliance with Turkey’s join to NATO, the studies 
about the first decades of the relations are limited. The best sources to evaluate 
are the primary ones such as Foreign Relations of the United States papers 
(FRUS) on Turkey, the documents from state archives of Turkey, and reports of 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In addition to them, autobiographies, and 
personal memoirs of the prominent actors as Joseph Grew are consulted. His 
autobiography
4
 covers the dynamics of his public diplomacy. While doing that, 
he does not only explain how did he deal with the Turkish government and 
handle American pressure over the new Turkish state, but also reveals the traces 
about maturing diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between two states 
in the 1920s. Roger Trask’s
5
 approaches to the economic relations between the 
USA and Turkey in a general perspective in this period. He focuses on the 
details of economic milestones like the US-Turkey Treaty of Commerce of 
1926, first Turkish loans secured in 1929. These deals were highly related to the 
American multinationals entrance to the Turkish market because these steps that 
the State Department took encouraged American businesspeople to conduct 
commercial activities in Turkey. Trask also gives Grew’s public diplomacy’s 
credit as a critical term in these negotiations. Waldo Heinrichs Jr.’s excellent 
portrait of Grew
6
 adds his interpretation of Grew and evaluates the dynamics of 
his public diplomacy. He supports that Grew achieved well in the restoration of 
Turkish-American relations since WWI by his cautious and detailed diplomacy. 
In his five years of service, the US image ranked from suspicious to credible in 
the Turkish decision-makers aspect. Lastly, Şuhnaz Yılmaz’s overview of 
Turkish-American relations in the late 1920s to 1930s
7
 joins to explain progress 
in political and economic relations between two states in the post-WWI to the 
pre-WWII period. Her argument is quite similar to Trask’s that explains how 
the Turkish image has evolved in this period in the American media and 
business circles with the construction of political relations and signature of 
commercial agreements. State support brought American capital to Turkey as 
                                               
4  Grew, Turbulent Era. 
5  Trask, “The United States and Turkish Nationalism.” 
6  Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the development of 
the United States diplomatic tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
7  Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-
War Era,”Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 2 (2006): 223-237. 
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loans and investments, and she draws attention to Grew’s success in this 
process, as well.  
In terms of evaluating the propaganda term, the best scholarship belongs 
to Johnnie Polando’s autobiography,
8
 presents the detailed story of the record-
breaking flight from New York to Istanbul and stands as an excellent source to 
rely on this topic. In fact, Polando does not only tell the story of the flight but 
also explains the details of this propaganda campaign and how it was turned 
into a diplomatic gesture by Grew’s efforts. In addition to this, newspaper 
articles from the US and Turkey, Cumhuriyet (Republic) was the only national 
newspaper at that time, are cited as the leading sources for propaganda tools. 
Specifically, the articles in Cumhuriyet were indispensable to explain the level 
of American campaigns and how they were requited in the Turkish public. 
Throughout Polando and Boardman’s visit, Cumhuriyet’s front pages devoted to 
their tour, comments, and meetings. Furthermore, researcher Stuart Kline’s A 
Chronicle of Turkish Aviation
9
 provides a proper chronological narrative of 
Turkish aviation history, which adds on to the reflections of Boardman-
Polando’s flight to Turkey and how it awed Turkish decision-makers. The story 
of the first aircraft factory in Turkey and its central place in Turkish 
modernization policies helps to explain this new republic’s need for 
technological infrastructure in the aviation industry, and the necessity of foreign 
involvement in this process. Similarly, Turkish journalist OktayVerel’s two-
volume books
10
 address the same topic by enriching it with a nationalistic 
approach. In his lines, obtaining a decent aviation industry was described as a 
national goal, and the establishment of a factory for this goal was a significant 
milestone due to the lack of technology. Therefore, this partnership must be 
considered within a trustworthy and non-imperialistic background foreign state. 
The combination of these two sources explains the question of why an 
American company with sufficient technological infrastructure gained a 
significant concession in this significant industry. In parallel to this answer, 
Nadir Bıyıkoğlu,
11
 reveals the details of the contract between Turkey and JFM, 
how did this partnership was established thanks to credible political relations 
and historical alliance between Turkey and Germany. Ihsan Tayhani’s detailed 
study of Turkish aviation in the early republican era
12
 supports this argument, as 
well. Nonetheless, he also brings depth to political motivations to adopt aviation 
                                               
8  Johnnie Polando, Wings over Istanbul: the life and flights of a pioneer aviator 
(Portsmouth, NH: P.E. Randall Publishers, 2000). 
9  Stuart Kline, A Chronicle of Turkish Aviation (Türk havacılık kronolojisi) (İstanbul: 
Havaş, 2002). 
10  Oktay Verel, İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir, (The future is in the skies, and it is ours) 
V.2 (İstanbul: Türk Hava Kurumu, 1985). 
11  H. Nadir Bıyıkoğlu, Türk Havacılık Sanayii (Turkish Aviation Industry) (Ankara: Ankara 
Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı, 1991). 
12  Tayhani, Atatürk’ün bağımsızlık politikası. 
92  MURAT IPLIKCI 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX  no. 1  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
technology from non-imperialistic states, and why it has to be a nationalistic 
goal in Mustafa Kemal Paşa’s mind. 
In light of these sources, this study aims to produce a unique work by 
combining economic and diplomatic dimensions of the relations between 
Turkey and the US with propaganda tools to bring depth to explain the process 
of CW’s penetration to the Turkish market. In this framework, the idea to be 
promoted is the following: Correct diplomatic and economic support of the 
states is crucial for the multinationals to invest in foreign countries and correct 
propaganda is an essential tool for to crown the process; in the end, both of 
these terms complete each other in the long run of foreign investment. All the 
deconstructed arguments given above are going to be used to construct the 
framework of this story.  
 
 
Heavy Diplomatic Propaganda 
  
While propaganda is source-based and cause-oriented content that aims 
for mass persuasion with any tools and any methods, public diplomacy is linked 
to the use of soft power. When some locks cannot be opened with the power of 
economy, persuasion, or use of hard power, and soft power like public 
diplomacy steps up. In political scientist Joseph Nye’s words, unlike hard 
power, soft power is based on indirect behavioral influences such as culture, 
values, and ideology.
13
 Therefore, it needs human interaction at its core rather 
than focusing on manipulative ways of propaganda. As it needs delicacy and 
intelligence, it is mostly advocated by professionally trained agents like 
diplomats. Ideally, a diplomat’s target would be the decision-makers, who also 
excel in public affairs or work for highly prestigious organizations. Therefore, 
public diplomacy should not be seen just as a euphemism for kinder, gentler 
propaganda but also a significant tool of the modern day’s diplomat.
14
 Because 
a diplomat’s audience has the power to authorize or not any proposal, 
persuasion tactics with any gentle propaganda is not applicable to attract them. 
Instead, persuasion is achieved by gaining trust and confidence. Credibility in 
this mission is essential, as gaining the trust of any decision-maker.
15
 More 
credible actors increase their chance of success, and more credible governments 
tend to attract other states in political and economic terms. In the multinational 
                                               
13  Nancy Snow, “Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Rethinking Diplomacy in the Age of 
Persuasion,” E-International Relations, last modified December 4, 2012, https://www.e-ir.info/ 
2012/12/04/public-diplomacy-and-propaganda-rethinking-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-persuasion/. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Rhonda S. Zaharna, “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” in 
War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, Yahya R. Kamalipour and Nancy 
Snow (eds.) (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham: Maryland, 2004), 220. 
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corporations’ cases, a diplomat in the host state would be one of the key actors. 
This person, by the tools of his or her government, would secure mutual trust 
between the countries and evaluate political and economic conditions and throw 
together his fellow businesspeople with the state he or she resides in. 
In CW’s entrance process in Turkey, Grew had an indispensable role in 
fixing of broken Turkish-American relations and influencing skeptic Turkish 
decision-makers about American sincerity in political and economic terms. That 
is why when CW started to settle in Turkey and run the factory in Kayseri in 
1932, Grew was leaving Turkish diplomatic post proudly and in dignity.
16
 
Before moving on to the historical narrative about Grew and his success in 
the conduction of public diplomacy, several background conclusions need to be 
discussed. Turkey was a country that aims to modernize itself, specifically in the 
technological industries, and due to lack of experience in many fields, it needs to 
establish credible partnerships in the 1930s. European powers were quite 
convenient role models for the guidance and partnership for Turkey. Historically, 
they were the mentors of the Ottoman statesmen in terms of modernization 
concessions throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. However, the Turkish decision-
makers, who grew up during the turbulent era of the Ottoman Empire, witnessed the 
damage of economic concessions given to European powers before. Therefore, they 
remained aloof from the partnership with these states except for their former ally 
Germany, once more. On the other hand, Turkey did not close the door to the 
others, and she seems quite eager to establish good diplomatic relations with them, 
who would like to invest in Turkey. She believed that keeping the diplomatic 
channels open would help to overcome the problems between the companies and 
investors. Furthermore, this partner should have a sustainable and robust economy, 
which would support its investors when it is needed. In light of these definitions, it 
can be deduced that Turkey was looking for a partner which did not have 
imperialist ambitions before, eager to establish a friendship with it and 
economically and technologically advanced. 
To explain Grew’s crucial role and the significance of his public 
diplomacy, it would be better to lay out a historical narrative. Before the arrival 
of Grew, the US perspective to Turkish diplomatic post was not more than 
maintaining American relief charities and missionary schools in these lands. 
The relations between two states mostly defined and conducted by non-
governmental agents.
17
 American missionaries’ reports about the poor 
conditions of Armenians and rejection of Armenian self-determination demands 
                                               
16  Grew, Turbulent Era, 916. 
17  Please see United States Department of State Papers relating to the foreign relations of 
the United States (FRUS), 1919. The Paris Peace Conference Volume II, Turkey 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010). 
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by the Ottoman officials shaped the American aspect towards Turkey from the 
late 19
th
 century to the early 20
th
 century.
18
 
Mediocre relations continued until WWI, which made the US and the 
Ottoman Empire enemies for the first time. Clearly, the relations between the 
two states have never been quite promising; however, it has never turned into 
open hostility, as well. During the war, the Ottoman and American forces did 
not face each other, thanks to the geographical barriers; however, the diplomatic 
relations were cut in 1917 and did not formed until 1927.  
Even though Grew’s official mission in Turkey started in 1927, he was 
very familiar with the transition and foundation of the new Turkish state after 
the Turkish War of Independence (TWI). After the war, the US government 
decided to send its representatives to watch negotiations between Turkey and 
the Allies in Lausanne in 1923. In this conference, the US was represented by 
three skillful diplomats led by Admiral Mark Bristol, who was the High 
Commissioner to Istanbul to protect American institutions and interests in the 
Ottoman Empire during dissolution upheaval. The others were Washburn Child, 
and Joseph Grew. Bristol’s position and mission were quite educational for 
Grew, and probably he learned much from him about Turks and Turkey. Bristol 
served as a quintessential open-door policy-minded diplomat, who believed in 
an intense but humble foreign policy to secure American interests while he was 
in Turkey.
19
 To secure such a policy, he believed in economic cooperation, as 
previous American diplomats like Oscar Straus used to do. As the period was 
not convenient to discuss economic relations, instead, he suggested helping 
defeated states to improve their economy by promoting loans until it would be 
ready for the US businessmen’ inflow to markets in these states.
20
 However, this 
policy should be conducted neither persistently persuasive nor intimidating the 
host state, and this defeated state should not feel she is a client state. The 
definitive words of this policy, which was the basics of public diplomacy, are 
assistance, advice, and sympathy.
21
 In such understanding, Bristol represented 
his country between 1919 and 1927. In that time, he made many friends among 
the Turkish decision-makers like Ismat Paşa (Prime Minister) and Tefvik Rüştü 
Bey (Minister of the Foreign Affairs), who would welcome his successor 
Joseph Grew later sympathetically for the sake of their friendship with Bristol.
22
 
                                               
18  Yılmaz, “Challenging the Stereotypes,” 224.  
19  Thomas A. Bryson, “Admiral Mark L. Bristol, an Open-Door Diplomat in 
Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, no. 4 (1974): 452. 
20  Aykut Kılınç, “Keeping the Door Open at the Lausanne Conference: The U.S. Open Door 
Policy in the Near East during 1920’s,” Çankaya University Journal of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, 8/1 (2011): 6. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Grew, Turbulent Era, 720. 
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When Grew arrived in Turkey, his mission was more or less apparent, 
restoring the relations between the US and Turkey while protecting the 
American interests.
23
 At the same time, the new state’s decision-makers were 
looking forward to normalizing relations with the Western powers as well. In 
Mustafa Kemal Paşa’s leadership, Turkey launched several reforms to 
modernize new state in Western standards, hoped to break the weak image of 
the Ottoman Empire its recent times, and restored the relations with the former 
hostile western countries.
24
 Despite promising approaches to both sides, Grew’s 
mission was not an easy task to accomplish. Four years after the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923, the US barely recognized Turkey, which was disturbing the 
Turkish decision-makers. In his one of the first formal meetings with the 
Turkish cabinet, Grew had to stay on the good side of Tevfik Rüştü Bey, who 
asked why the US Congress did not ratify the Treaty of Lausanne.
25
 The 
problems from Ottoman times, as minority problems in Turkey or American 
missionary schools’ future, have not solved yet.  
Grew challenged his first problem as soon as he arrived in Turkey. 
Several teachers of the American School in Bursa were mentoring some Turkish 
students about Christianity, and this incident submitted to the Ministry of 
National Education of Turkey. It caused a great disturbance in public.
26
 In these 
times, Turkey was laying a foundation for a secular state, which planned to keep 
the state institutions apart from not only Islam but also whole religious 
practices. Furthermore, the nationalistic policy of the state was colliding with 
the existence of these autonomous schools as well. Grew knew that the Turkish 
decision-makers were not personally opposed to the existence of these 
missionary schools; even prominent deputies like Yusuf Akçura and the leader 
of Turkish Hearts (a significant institution to promote Turkish nationalism in 
education) Hamdullah Suphi Bey were great admirers of the education system 
of these schools.
27
 However, the American schools’ future was uncertain 
because of conflicting policies; and the religious propaganda issue left the new 
ambassador in a lurch.
28
 
Grew believed that the future of these schools was quite unpromising 
and compensation of the prospective closure of these schools for the 
improvement in the relations should be tolerable.
29
 Therefore, he decided to get 
away from this problem with minimum damages to the relations and did not put 
                                               
23  Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 146-147. 
24  Dankwart A. Rustow, The Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic (New Jersey: 
Englewood Cliffs, 1958) 298-99. 
25  Grew, Turbulent Era, 749. 
26  Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: the transition to a multi-party system (New Jersey: 
Princeton, 1959) 61. 
27  Grew, Turbulent Era, 741. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid., 758. 
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any pressure on Turkish decision-makers not to take a decision against these 
schools. However, this option did not satisfy American public opinion, either. 
Throughout the year of 1928, the teachers of these schools were suspended, and 
some of the American schools were closed, which was protested by some 
American newspapers harshly. Grew met with Tevfik Rüştü Bey and İsmet Bey 
once, to ease the pressures on the American schools and got their words.
30
 Then, 
he advised the State Department not to send a diplomatic note to Turkey and did 
not give an interview to any American newspapers to defuse the political 
tension. The Turkish decision-makers appreciated Grew’s humble silence over 
these issues. They received Grew’s request to defuse tension and tried to ignore 
similar complaints about other American schools. 
It can be said that the compromise was the first significant diplomatic 
gain of Grew. He believed that a political understanding must be shown to this 
new state’s objectives and practices that it needed to adopt. Turkey was up to 
promote its own republican type of government recently, which was very 
unusual compared to American democracy. At least, Grew knew that the US 
must set its foreign policy towards Turkey by considering its psychology.
31
 
Even so, some practices caused disturbances to the relations between the US 
and Turkey at times; the US governments were to act in this direction. Turkey 
was on the same page with Grew, in this aspect. They hoped that other states 
would understand the social and political transformation in Turkey and show 
respect to its domestic affairs. Turkey’s modernization with western institutions 
will serve to both sides’ interests, in the end. Grew’s public diplomacy towards 
such sympathy made Turkish decision-makers to show their gratitude back to 
Grew. Grew defined his role as the following: 
 
“I have learned and seen the power o f fairness and generosity in Government relationships, leading 
to confidence in him and his character that has meant much to all American interests. Again and 
again, Turkish officials have given me their witness in this regard.”32 
 
In terms of their historical evaluation, the history of American missionary 
schools in Turkey, and their case study in Grew’s public diplomacy topics are 
both convenient examples for this paper’s thesis. Grew’s cautious and 
sympathetic attitude restored the Turkish trust towards Americans and enhanced 
its credibility. Then, he launched the second phase of his campaign, the 
invitation of American investments to Turkey.  
In the late 1920s, the American companies were quite reluctant to make 
investments there. There are several reasons for this hesitance. First of all, 
Turkey was the heir of the debtor Ottoman Empire. The Americans were 
                                               
30  Ibid., 761. 
31  Ibid., 701. 
32  Ibid., 814. 
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concerned that the empire’s insecure economy may have been inherited by the 
new state.
33
 In fact, they were right on this concern, because Turkey was having 
financial difficulties in the 1920s. She had already lost a significant part of her 
population and regions, including petroleum centers as Kirkuk after WWI. 
Secondly, Turkey had some political risks. The state departments generally 
stalled the foreign investments, and the nationalistic approach was valid in the 
economic aspect, as well. Therefore, Grew decided to strengthen his hand with 
the state support. In 1929, Grew enhanced the relations with a trade agreement 
between two states. After he received his confirmation from the State 
Department, he immediately sat down with Turkish decision-makers to 
negotiate a new treaty. This one would be the improved version of the Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation of 1830, which would allow more economic 
cooperation in trade and investment. In addition to the agreement, Ismet Bey 
mentioned that Turkey asked for some loans in several conversations, which 
made Grew urge the financial mission of the State Department.
34
 Therefore, 
when such an agreement is offered, Turkey signed it without hesitation.
35
 
This treaty paved the way for American investments and loans to Turkey. 
With the inflow of the capital, both states approved an economic partnership in 
trade, and thisimproved Turkey’s trustworthiness investments-wise in the eyes 
of American people involved in the business. In the next year, a delegation 
headed by former Minister of Finance, Şükrü Bey, went to the USA to secure a 
first foreign loan from this state. Grew sent a letter to the famous banker J. P. 
Morgan and introduced Şükrü Bey to him personally. According to Grew, this 
trip would be an excellent opportunity to develop the relations favorably, and 
Şükrü Bey would be more eager to promote American capital and methods in 
Turkey when he returns.
36
 More importantly, this financial trip overcame the 
prejudices of both sides, and both American companies and Turkish decision-
makers were attracted to each other. Indeed, it led other delegations to visit the 
USA, as the one received by Glenn Curtiss.  
 
 
A Shut Down 
 
1929 ended as the dawn of a better age in Turkish-American relations. 
Most of the political problems were overcome, and a new economic agenda 
                                               
33  Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 141.  
34  Grew, Turbulent Era, 854-855.  
35  “Ticaret sözleşmeleri yapmakla görevlendirilen Heyet-i Murahhasa'dan Zekai, Mustafa 
Şeref, Menemenli Numan beylere hükümetimiz adına imza yetkisi verilmesi.” (“Granting 
authority to Zekai Mustafa, Mustafa Şeref and Menemenli Numan to sign treaty of 
commerce.”) DAGM, 5-48-17, November 26, 1929. 
36  Trask, “The United States and Turkish Nationalism,” 64.  
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between these two governments were getting underway. On the other hand, it 
was a lucky year for the CW because Turkey’s German partner JFM started to 
fall into a financial crisis due to the Great Depression of 1929. Disappointing 
news kept coming from the German side in 1930, which halted the production 
and finalized by the withdrawal of JFM from the Turkish market.   
Theoretically, there were two reasons why Turkey and Germany 
established a partnership, which would be quite useful to understand the CW-
Turkey partnership in the upcoming years. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany were allies for a long time already, dating back to the late 19th 
century. Germany became a trustful ally of the Ottoman Empire, who had 
seemed to have no interest in obtaining troublesome concessions in the empire 
compared to the other Great Powers. Secondly, Germany provided credits and 
arms to the Ottomans when the state needed military and economic aid, while 
the other powers stood away in the early 20th century.
37
 Turkey, as the former 
hostile of Italy, France, and Britain, preferred a German company’s cooperation 
for this economic concession thanks to these reasons.  
As it was stated before, becoming a monopoly in the Turkish market was 
coming with many profits. JFM obtained many more rights than aircraft 
production in Turkey by virtue of the agreement. It took over aerial 
transportation, airmail sectors, and secured the establishment of another facility 
planned to be built in Istanbul.
38
 Moreover, the company was exempted from 
tax as well. The sum of these concessions shows the potential appeal of the 
Turkish markets for investors. In October 1926, Kayseri Aircraft Factory 
opened with the attendance of both German and Turkish officials.
39
 However, 
the existence of the partnership did not last for long. In the early 1930s, Turkey 
became a country with an aircraft factory and employees, but did not have a 
technology to produce aircraft. Therefore, late 1929 was a perfect year for CW 
to step in.   
                                               
37  See Edward Mead Earle’s Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Baghdad Railway: A study 
in imperialism for further information.   
38  “Yeşilköy Tamir Atölyesi ve Hangarı, Divrik Hava Meydanı, Nuri Demirağ Uçak 
Fabrikası ve Beşiktaş Uçak Atölyesi ile Almanya’ya sipariş edilen uçak hangar planları ve 
Alman Hugo Junkers'ın uçak üretimi için teklif.” (“Plans of Yeşilköy repair shop and 
hangar, Divrik Airport, Nuri Demirağ Aircraft Factory and Beşiktaş Aircraft repair  shop 
and the offer to German Hugo Junkers for aircraft manufacturing.”) DAGM, 59-397-6, 
March 27, 1928; “Junkers Şirketi ile hava nakliyatı konusunda yapılan makaveletname” 
(“The contract about airmailing is given to Junkers”), DAGM, September 11, 1929; 
“Junkers Uçak Şirketi'nin Türkiye'degenişkapsamlıbirhavahattıkurmakiçinyapmışo 
lduğutekliflerinözetivesözleşmemüsveddeleri” (“The summary of Junker’s offer to 
establish aerial line in Turkey and this offer's rough draft”), DAGM, April 12, 1927. 
39  “Türk Faaliyet ve Azminin Feni Sahada Yeni Bir Muvaffakiyeti ve Eseri” (“A new 
scientific victory and work of Turkish determination”), İkdam, October 8, 1926.  
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Many years before 1929, the Ottoman Ministry of War received a letter 
from an American investor on September 9, 1913. In this letter, an investor was 
sending the features and price details of a boat plane that he marketed, which 
received awards in several races and proved its durability in terrible weather 
conditions.
40
 This vendor was Glenn Curtiss. However, this offer did not receive 
feedback, and Curtiss did not send another offer to the empire, as well. 
His next offer waited for nearly two decades, which took place in 1929. 
Turkey had already made a deal with JFM in those days; however, the deal was 
not promising because of JFM’s financial troubles. Turkey was in search of a 
replacement partner in case of the termination of the deal. For this purpose, a 
small Turkish delegation led by Major Şerif Bey and Captain Ferruh Bey was 
assigned to observe American aviation advancements and sent to the USA for a 
tour, in July 1929.
41
 This tour was an excellent opportunity for Curtiss, and his 
new partner Wright, to introduce their new company to the Turkish delegation. 
By the initiatives of Joseph Grew and the US Commercial Attaché in Turkey, 
Julian Gillespie Turkish delegation was put in touch with Glenn Curtiss. An 
exclusive catalog is prepared for them, and Curtiss sent a private letter to the 
leaders who were stating praise for the modernization progress in Turkey and 
how CW would be honored to contribute this process.
42
 It seems the delegation 
was quite pleased with the interest has shown to them. A note was sent to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about delegation’s favorable aspect of doing 
business with Americans.
43
 
In 1930, CW launched a European tour to canvass their products to the 
new markets. As one of the leading destinations, they arrived in Turkey on May 
18, 1930. The touring group spent a couple of days in Turkey with the 
promotion of exhibitions. According to the Cumhuriyet, the Turks showed a 
great interest in these exhibitions; specifically, the one which demonstrated a 
short flight from Istanbul to Ankara. Ismet Paşa and his family were among the 
attendants of this show.
44
 
Despite Turkey’s urgent need for a partner in this field, it did not sign any 
contract with CW, neither when the Turkish delegation visited the USA, nor 
                                               
40  Stuart Kline, A chronicle of Turkish aviation, 76. 
41  “İngiltere ve Amerika havacılığı konusunda araştırma yapmak için görevlendirilenlere 
siyasi pasaport verilmesi.” (“Issuing political passports to the researchers who would visit 
England and the USA.”) DAGM, 30-18-1, July 3, 1929. 
42  Kline, A Chronicle of Turkish aviation, 162. 
43  “Türk Tayyare heyetinin Amerika'da gördüğü ilgi Washington Elçiliğimizden alınan 
yazı.” (“A memo from Turkish Embassy in Washington D.C. about the attention that 
Turkish delegate received in the USA.”) DAGM, 30-10-0, August 29, 1929. 
44  “Amerikalı Misafirler- Amerikan tayyarecileri dün sabah geldi” (“American aviators 
arrived in yesterday”), Cumhuriyet, May 19, 1930. 1; “Misafir tayyareciler Eskişehir’e 
gittiler” (The guest aviators went to Eskişehir), Cumhuriyet, May 20, 1930. 2. 
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when CW’s pilots and agents toured in Turkey. The final step to convince 
Turkey about the American aviation industry was yet to come. 
 
 
A Stunt 
 
When American pilots Russell Boardman and Johnnie Polando planned 
to break the world record in the longest distance with a non-stop flight, they 
decided to rely on their Bellanca brand aircraft which was designed for CW and 
amplified with a Wright Whirlwind engine.
45
 Throughout the year of 1930, 
these two adventurers prepared their plane for this flight, and waited until 
summer 1931 for the best flying conditions. The record which they would 
attempt to break was held at that time by two French pilots, Dieudonne Coste 
and Maurice Bellonte. They accomplished this record by flying 4912 miles 
from Paris to Manchuria. The American pilots set their destination from New 
York to Istanbul, which would be a distance of roughly 5000 miles. After 
Boardman and Polando had received the necessary permissions, sponsored by 
the New York Times, and had set the date, the reams of news started to be 
published in the American media. The pilots took off from New York on July 
28, and after that day every single detail about their journey was published.
46
 In 
addition to that, many copies of the New York Times of July 28were given to 
the pilots for airdropping them to the European capitals while they were passing 
by. If they can successfully landin Turkey, they would deliver a copy to 
Mustafa Kemal Paşa, as well.
47
 
 After forty-nine hours of flight, the pilots landed Yeşilköy Airport, 
İstanbul, on July 30. They were received by Ambassador Grew, governor, and 
mayor of Istanbul, president of THK (Turkish Aeronautical Association), 
national-foreign press, and a huge cheering crowd. Several newspapers stated 
that the pilots were welcomed as heroes. Indeed, it was true.
48
 After short 
comments and countless handshakes, they were taken to the Perapalas Hotel to 
rest. The suit of the hotel was booked to the heroes.  
When Boardman and Polando arrived in Turkey, the current record 
holders, Coste and Bellonte, were in Istanbul for a propaganda tour to sell 
                                               
45  Johnnie Polando, Wings over Istanbul: the life and flights of a pioneer aviator 
(Portsmouth: P. E. Randall Publisher, 2000), 42. 
46  “Two Ocean Planes Still Unreported,” The New York Sun, July 29, 1931, 8; “Boardman 
and Polando Land in Istanbul in 5000-mile Record Non-Stop Hop,” New York Evening 
Post, July 30, 1931, 2; “Welcome Aviators to Turkey,” Ballston Spa Daily Journal, July 
31, 1931, 2; “Air Heroes to See Turkish President,” The New York Evening Post, July 31, 
1931, 2. “Boardman-Polando Aid Fire Victims,” The Citizen-Adviser, August 7, 1931, 1. 
47  Polando, Wings over Istanbul, 48.   
48   “Welcome Aviators to Turkey”, “Air Heroes to See Turkish President”. 
A Stunt, A Shut-Down, and Heavy Diplomatic Propaganda  101 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX no. 1  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
French planes to Turkey. Polando remembers their first meeting with the French 
pilots and states:  
 
“Suddenly, two unshaven, uncombed, dirty Americans flew in Bellanca aircraft powered 
by a Wright Whirlwind engine claiming, quietly, that they just flew farther by at least 
ninety miles than the Frenchmen.”49 
 
 Polando and Boardman were proud and jubilant, but compared to 
Gillespie’s joy, theirs was spiritless. The arrival of American pilots collapsed the 
French deal with the Turkish government and strengthened Gillespie’s hand, 
who was seeking a deal for CW. When all pilots were photographed together, 
Gillespie was chortling with joy.
50
 
On their first day in Turkey, the pilots met with journalists. In these 
meetings, they repeated what Grew told them to state. They praised Istanbul’s 
beauty, the warmness of the Turkish delegation, Mustafa Kemal Paşa’s 
leadership and Turkey’s modernization process.
51
 On this day, the pilots also 
received the message of Mustafa Kemal Paşa, who invited them to Yalova to 
meet them in person, on July 31.
52
 
On the following day, the pilots arrived in Yalova in the afternoon and 
were greeted by another huge and cheering crowd. Before Mustafa Kemal Paşa 
received them, they met with İsmet Paşa and were awarded the very prestigious 
medals of Turkey for their great courage and success. Grew and İsmet Paşa 
gave speeches praising the friendship between Turkey and the USA. Then, the 
pilots were received by Mustafa Kemal Paşa in his mansion. Paşa asked short 
questions to the pilots about their journey and plans, praised the advancement of 
American aviation and expressed his enthusiasm about the future of Turkish-
American relations.
53
 
 Boardman and Polando spent a week in Turkey after their visit to 
Mustafa Kemal Paşa and left Turkey on August 9. During this time, they toured 
Istanbul, visited Turkish aviators and several facilities, and met with many other 
Turkish officials. Most importantly, they were received as the men of the hour 
wherever they went. Turkish press covered the pilots and narrated every move 
of theirs to the readers as well.
54
 When they were leaving, probably everyone in 
Istanbul had heard of their names, Cape Cod, Bellanca, and Curtiss-Wright.  
                                               
49  Polando, Wings over Istanbul, 54-55. 
50  Grew, Turbulent Era, 892.   
51  Verel, İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir, 654. 
52  “Gazi Hz. Bugün Hava kahramanlarını Kabul Edecek” (“Gazi is going to receive hero 
aviators, today”) Cumhuriyet, August 1, 1931, 1. 
53  Verel, İstikbal Göklerin Gökler Bizimdir, 657-658. 
54  “Bir Hamlede Nevyork’tan İstanbul’a” (“Newyork to Istanbul with one fell swoop”, 
Cumhuriyet, July 31, 1931, 1; “Gazi Hz. Bugün Hava kahramanlarını Kabul Edecek”; 
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Nothing could be better for the Grew’s public diplomacy in Turkey. He used 
this opportunity to turn it into diplomatic contact. Not only did the interest of the 
Turkish government please him, but also the crowds’ embracement of the pilots. 
The cheer poured to Cumhuriyet’s columns, which published pilots’ photos to the 
front page for a week and commented on this event's possible reflections on the 
relations. Cumhuriyet’s editor-in-chief, Yunus Nadi, published an article about the 
pilots and the record, on August 3. As the heart of the matter, he explained that 
Turkish-American relations had been in stagnation for a very long time and stressed 
this event would lead to a new, promising chapter between the two states in the 
nearest future.
55
 After the pilots were received by Mustafa Kemal Paşa and honored 
by him, the US authorities and press sent their regards to Turkey, and President 
Hoover sent a thank note to Mustafa Kemal Paşa.
56
 
When Polando and Boardman arrived in Turkey in 1931, the other factors 
which would help CW’s inflow to the Turkish market were more or less 
provided. Grew has already been shuttled back and forth between the Turkish 
decision-makers to improve relations. Then, his diligent work crowned with this 
stunt. Moreover, Turkey has already canceled the partnership with Junkers, 
which made Turkey look for another partner in the aviation industry. It seems 
the other European state aware of Turkey’s search, and at least French investors 
were visiting Turkey to sell aircraft as Polando underlined in his memoirs.  
Therefore, Boardman and Polando’s record-breaking flight to Turkey 
promotes a great advertisement of the American aviation for Turkey, as well as 
CW’s popularity. Moreover, by becoming a part of such kind of worldwide 
event, Turkey possibly felt both respected and flattered. If the interests of 
Mustafa Kemal Paşa, the Turkish government, and the public to the event are 
considered, this inference is quite logical. All these developments enabled the 
introduction of American aviation technology and the CW brand to Turkey and 
the idea of America’s respectful partnership position for Turkey in this field. 
 
                                                                                                                   
Cumhuriyet, August 1, 1931, 1; “Hava Kahramanları Abideye Çelenk Koydular” (“Hero 
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Conclusion 
 
On September 17, 1931, Turkey started the negotiations with CW to 
promote an agreement on becoming a new partner in the aviation industry. 
According to this project, TOMTAŞ’s factory would be assigned to CW for a 
year, and at the end of the year this contract would be extended in terms of the 
results.
57
 The enactment was signed between the sides on November 3, 1931. It 
seems the previous insecure agreement drove Turkey to negotiate a short-term 
one for this time. In the enactment, Turkey clearly stated that the accords should 
be observed to further the partnership.
58
 Similar to the previous agreement, 
Turkey would keep the rights of the Kayseri factory, while CW would utilize it 
to produce aircraft, manufacture spare parts, and establish airline facilities. The 
only client of these regulations and products would be Turkey.
59
 
After CW spent three months in Turkey, the sides met and evaluated the 
details of a one-year plan. According to the plan, CW would produce six 
Fledgling type aircrafts in Turkey as soon as possible, with most of the parts of 
the planes being produced as well in the country. In addition to this, the motor 
manufacturing system would be developed too. In return, Turkey would buy 
these products. Furthermore, CW would be the owner of airline concessions in 
Turkey. All the developments in each field would be submitted as a report by 
CW, every year.
60
 In addition to this plan, Turkey would also purchase 
additional aircrafts from CW. On June 19, 1932, a new contract was signed 
between the two sides, which stated the details about this purchase. Turkey 
planned to buy at least one and at most three aircraft from CW annually, and the 
pricing was to take into account delivery, spare parts, crew and insurance costs, 
as well.
61
 
The first year of the contract went well. According to an enactment which 
was released on January 14, 1933, Turkey decided to extend its contract with 
CW.
62
 Clearly, it was the result of a promising report about the progress that 
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was submitted to the Under secretariat of the Ministry of National Defense. In 
this report, it was indicated that most of the production was completed, and 
approximately ten thousand pieces of aircraft sections were manufactured in a 
year.
63
 In addition to this, twenty-four Hawk-II and eight Fledgling 2C1 were to 
be manufactured in Turkey until 1935. This progress pleased both sides, and 
Turkey kept extending the contract in the upcoming years, as well. 
Turkey has manufactured approximately two-hundred aircrafts until 
WWII. Most of them were constructed during the partnership with CW. 
However, with the economic burden that WWII created, the production rate of 
the factory decreased, and the process turned into maintenance and repair once 
more, in time. With the Marshall Plan, Turkey started to receive or buy aircraft 
from the USA, which completely stopped the production in 1950.   
Turkey signed this deal with CW because it was quite eager to establish 
good diplomatic relations with a non-imperialistic state, which would like to 
establish economic partnerships and provide guidance to the Turkish state. It 
believed that keeping the diplomatic channels open would overcome the 
problems between the companies and investors. Furthermore, this partner 
should have a sustainable and robust economy, which would allow Turkey to 
support its investors when needed. In light of these definitions, it can be 
deduced that Turkey was looking for a partner which was not hostile before, 
eager to establish a good diplomatic relations, and which was economically and 
technologically advanced. In the end, the marvelous efforts of Grew and the 
epic stunt displayed in 1931 showed Turkey that she would find such a partner 
somewhere else besides Europe. 
At this point, it would be better to give plenty of credits to the Grew 
factor. Claiming that Grew understood the Turks and Turkey in the short time 
he spent among them would be fair. During his five-year service in Turkey, he 
changed the course of relations between the USA and Turkey and established a 
promising partnership, as a consequence of his public diplomacy’s success. He 
was the successor of other “Dollar Diplomacy” tradition’s diplomats like Oscar 
Straus and Admiral Bristol. The main aim of this approach was to bring 
American investments to the Ottoman Empire and her heir Turkey by 
improving political relations. In Grew’s diplomacy, the priority was the 
economic partnership on the first hand; however, he believed that until the 
restoration of the relations, the investments should wait. Everything should 
succeed in diplomacy, and every opportunity must be taken, which would serve 
on behalf of the relations. Ultimately, improvement in economic relations 
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would come. Grew was chasing any single detail to construct his public 
diplomacy, and he succeeded in his mission. A small conversation between 
Polando and Grew just after the landing would explain this aspect better: 
 
“Ambassador Grew’s greeting was warm but a bit reversed. The reason was soon evident. 
‘Was it non-stop?’ he asked guardedly. ‘Yes’, I answered, puzzled by the question. Then 
he really glowed. ‘That’s all I wanted to know’, he said chuckling.”64 
 
This article stands as a case study of the commercial achievement of an 
American multinational in a foreign market; however, it also underlines the 
significant factors in both foreign relations and their economic advantages, as 
well as the contribution of commercial propaganda techniques to such a process. 
With the lack of one of these factors, investment achievements cannot be 
completed. Furthermore, this study also reveals the backbones of the current 
Turkish-American alliance formed in the 1950s, as well. Economic integration 
was achieved thanks to the credible political integration between the sides. The 
US started to emerge as a good partner to rely on economically and politically 
in Turkish decision-makers’ perspectives during the 1930s. Propaganda 
campaigns and effective public diplomacy helped them to establish that outlook, 
and the sustainability of these features consolidated the integration. Therefore, it 
was to no surprise that Turkey showed the ambition to join the Western alliance 
led by the US in the 1950s. 
Today CW and Turkey pursue their partnership in various fields like 
defense and energy industries. In time, aircraft business was replaced with 
these, and the aircraft factory in Kayseri has already shut down. Still, the story 
of this exceptional partnership, which combined with a heavy diplomatic 
schedule, a shut down, and a stunt remains interesting.  
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